Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-9pm4c Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-26T23:11:30.915Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

7 - Institutional Sources of Federal Stability I

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 December 2009

Mikhail Filippov ,
Peter C. Ordeshook  and
Olga Shvetsova
Mikhail Filippov
Affiliation:
Washington University, St Louis
Peter C. Ordeshook
Affiliation:
California Institute of Technology
Olga Shvetsova
Affiliation:
Duke University, North Carolina
Get access

Summary

The balance of social interests, the separation and balance of powers, were meant to secure liberty, but it was still uncertain, after the instrument had been framed and ratified, whether the balance would not be too precarious to come to rest anywhere; and whether the arms of government, separated in parchment, could come together in reality to cooperate in the formation and execution of policy.

Hofstadter 1969: 70

The constitution of the United States is an admirable work, nevertheless one may believe that its founders would not have succeeded, had not the previous 150 years given the different States of the Union the taste for, and practice of, provincial governments.

Alexis de Toqueville

I confess, as I enter the Building, I stumble on the threshold. I meet with a National Government, instead of a Federal Union of Sovereign States.

Samuel Adams 1787, on the U.S. Constitution

Introduction

Adams can be forgiven his initial cynical assessment of the newly proposed Constitution since he played the critical role in ensuring its approval by the Massachusetts ratifying convention. His cousin John, on the other hand, was perhaps less enthusiastic of its possibilities, for Adams “knew full well the dependence of republicanism on the character of the people” (Wood 1969: 570) and in this respect he was more than a little apprehensive of the future.

Type
Chapter
Information
Designing Federalism
A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions
 , pp. 226 - 258
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2004

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×