Thankfully free from outright war, the US relationship with North Korea over the past dozen years has nevertheless been just as strained and combative as that with Iraq. Edging uncomfortably close to war during the first plutonium reprocessing crisis in 1993–94, both sides reached an uneasy truce that fell apart dramatically a decade later. Deterrent and compellent threats underlay all of the negotiations, with nuclear overtones that were not present to the same extent in the Persian Gulf. This chapter analyzes both crises, drawing lessons as to how WMD affect real-world conflict situations.

THE FIRST CRISIS (1993–94)

Even though its nuclear research program dates back to the 1950s, by the mid-1980s North Korea's main communist benefactors – China and the Soviet Union – were providing less than certain defense support, leading the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to decide to develop a secret nuclear weapons capability as a deterrent against US military intervention. During a covert refueling of the Yongbyon reactor in 1989, US intelligence agencies estimate that the DPRK extracted and potentially reprocessed approximately ten to twelve kilograms of plutonium, sufficient fissile material for at least two nuclear devices, depending on the design. US officials also suspect North Korea of having produced a wide range of CB weapons – an estimated stockpile of 2,500 to 5,000 tons – and ballistic missiles with nearly intercontinental range.