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5 - Three's a crowd? Understanding triadic employment relationships

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 December 2009

Matthew Bidwell
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of Strategy and Management, INSEAD
Isabel Fernandez-Mateo
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of Strategic and International Management, London Business School
Peter Cappelli
Affiliation:
University of Pennsylvania
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Summary

Introduction

There are many facets to the typical employment relationship. At its very simplest, employment involves the exchange of labor for compensation. Nevertheless, employment relationships also involve control of the worker by the firm, the acquisition of skills through experience and training, learning about each others' qualities and intentions, and career progression as the worker moves from role to role within the organization. In addition, employment usually imposes a variety of specific legal obligations on both employer and employee. Traditionally, these obligations have been combined into a single relationship between worker and firm.

In recent years, however, we have seen the growth of “triadic” employment arrangements, in which important characteristics of employment are divided among workers' relationships with two firms: a “client” and an “intermediary.” The intermediary generally acts as the legal employer of the worker, but the actual work is performed at a client site. Consider, for example, employment relationships for temporary agency workers. Legally, the worker is employed by the agency, which also provides the worker with compensation and any benefits. Career progression for the worker often results from the worker being assigned by the agency to roles in different clients. The worker's relationship with the client also has clear elements of an employment tie, however: the worker provides labor to the client at its site; the worker often also accepts substantial control by the client over his or her work. We cannot therefore understand how the worker is employed without examining both these ties.

Type
Chapter
Information
Employment Relationships
New Models of White-Collar Work
, pp. 142 - 178
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2008

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