This book assumes what I call the Life Claim: an individual is a refugee if their right to life is threatened in their home countries, regardless of whether it is threatened from persecution, violence, poverty or other life-threatening conditions. All such refugees have a right to asylum, assuming they have no other mechanism for accessing protection, and assuming states have the capacity to accept such individuals.

The Life Claim is limited in scope, establishing a sufficient but not necessary condition: it is sufficient that a refugee's right to life is undermined, but not necessary. It is not necessary because those suffering other harms, such as life-long detention, are likely refugees as well. The Life Claim is also neutral as to when, precisely, states no longer have the capacity to accept refugees, and so can ethically turn them away. It may be that a state lacks capacity if the costs of accepting more refugees are very high, or if accepting refugees endangers citizens’ access to basic rights and liberal institutions. My aim here is merely to demonstrate that, however we measure capacity, states ought not to differentiate between those fleeing persecution, those fleeing general violence, and those fleeing other life-threatening conditions.

Importantly, I do not claim that all individuals fleeing life-threatening conditions are refugees. A ninety year old without access to very costly cancer treatment does not necessarily have a right to asylum abroad to obtain treatment, because the right to life needn't entail the right to access costly life-saving treatment at age ninety. In contrast, an individual who cannot access basic medical care does have a right to asylum, assuming an individual's right to life is violated if they lack access to basic medical care. Determining who precisely has their right to life violated would require a broader discussion of rights, but this is not necessary for my purposes: I merely wish to demonstrate that those fleeing persecution do not have a special right to asylum as compared to those fleeing other equally life-threatening rights violations.

There are two common claims that are inconsistent with the Life Claim. I describe them below, along with my objections.