The foreign policy of Spain under Franco during the Second World War has been the source of much historiographical controversy. The interpretations have swung between the following alternatives: either it can be defined as a policy of voluntary neutrality between the two belligerent sides, the aim of which was to avoid participation in the war at all costs; or it can be seen as a policy of qualified neutrality, imposed by the circumstances and subject to the temptation of intervention in favour of the Axis powers. A brief review of the opinions of various witnesses and historians will allow us to appreciate this difference in interpretation.

According to Willard L. Beaulac, the United States Counsellor of Embassy in Madrid between 1941 and 1944, Franco had been the Allies' ‘silent ally’, and the objective of his foreign policy was to ‘keep out of active participation in the war’. In contrast, in the opinion of Sir Samuel Hoare, the British ambassador in Madrid between 1940 and 1944, ‘Spanish non-belligerency did not mean Spanish neutrality’ and ‘if Franco did not come into the war, it was for no love of us or doubt about an ultimate German victory’.

This difference of appreciation is mirrored in the differing opinions of two Spanish protagonists. For José María Doussinague, the general director of foreign policy in the Spanish foreign ministry during the conflict, Spain had followed ‘a clearly marked policy of peace’ and its ‘objective was to reach the end of the war without being drawn into the turmoil’.