The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the crisis in Poland have raised two unresolved and controversial issues in East–West relations. First, what is the utility of applying Western economic sanctions to change Soviet behavior? Second, the recent labor unrest in Poland has highlighted many divisive issues in relations between the two Germanies and the USSR, and has reminded the world that the German question has not entirely been resolved.

This book deals with questions at the heart of these two issues–the politics of East–West trade and the German problem. The treatment is partly historical, but the subject remains of great importance today. The book addresses a number of key themes that will continue to determine East–West relations for the foreseeable future.

The United States and the Federal Republic once agreed on the imperative of using East–West trade as a political instrument to elicit concessions from the Soviet Union. Why did West Germany alter its policy and cease to view East–West trade as primarily a political lever? The book examines in detail the German government's historical attempts to change Soviet policy through the use of economic weapons and explains why, when the Social Democratic–Free Democratic coalition came to power in 1969, it ceased to use trade as a primarily political instrument. The Soviet side of this equation is discussed in equal detail, in particular why the USSR has not historically responded to Western use of the trade weapon.

Prior to the detente era, Bonn and Moscow disagreed on the definition of the German problem and its possible resolution. Trade was used as one form of negotiation in discussions on Germany.