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Chapter 4 - Trade and the Berlin crisis: 1958–1961

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 January 2010

Angela E. Stent
Affiliation:
Georgetown University, Washington DC
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Summary

The Soviet Government seeks to have the necessary change in Berlin's situation take place in a cold atmosphere, without haste, and unnecessary friction, with maximum possible consideration for the interests of the parties concerned.

Soviet ultimatum, November 27, 1958

The Berliners have a right to know how the land lies. The people of this city are strong enough to stand the truth. The Soviet Union has given its mastiff Ulbricht a slightly longer leash. This city desires peace but it will not capitulate … But peace has never been saved by weakness. There is a point when you have to recognize that you cannot retreat one step. This point has been reached.

Willy Brandt, 1961

Scarcely had the Soviet–German agreement been signed than the Kremlin challenged its newly established modus vivendi with Bonn and initiated a new crisis in East–West relations that sought to alter the status quo. During this conflict, which lasted until the resolution of the Cuban missle crisis in 1962, the focus of East–West tension shifted to West Berlin, whose links to the Federal Republic and protection by the Western Allies became the focus of the unresolved German question. For us to analyze the importance of Soviet–West German relations during the Berlin crisis, it is necessary to examine the disparity in the significance of West Berlin for the two countries. The USSR and the FRG had conflicting interests in Berlin, and both viewed the status of West Berlin as a central issue in their bilateral relations.

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From Embargo to Ostpolitik
The Political Economy of West German-Soviet Relations, 1955–1980
, pp. 68 - 92
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1982

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