Axis advances in Europe and Asia during the last part of 1940 fueled demands for a more effective American preparedness agency. The result was the creation of the Office of Production Management (OPM), staffed by corporate liberals who moved over from the National Defense Advisory Commission (NDAC). A greater sense of urgency gripped them now, as the rush of events broadened the scope of their activities, increased overall defense production demands, and drew the United States deeper into the escalating conflict. In the spring of 1941, lend-lease replaced cash-and-carry, permitting the United States to supply arms and munitions to the British. Aid-short-of-war gave way to an unofficial naval war between the United States and Germany in the fall. Under these circumstances, corporate liberals redoubled their mobilization efforts and preparedness advanced further.

Under intense strain now, corporate liberals struggled to put the economy of a neutral nation on something approaching a wartime footing. Construction of an emergency administrative state designed to accomplish this end provided their focus. They constantly emphasized the interdependence of the public and private sectors, and the resultant need for teamwork. President Roosevelt and the military generally supported corporate liberal exertions. On the other hand, ideologically inclined New Dealers, all-outers, the liberal press, and isolationists kept up their attack on the evolving emergency state. Despite formidable opposition, corporate liberals prevailed, and U.S. industry substantially increased production of weapons and related goods. Corporate liberal guidance of the United States’“near wartime state,” though imperfect, proved successful enough.

President Roosevelt created the Office of Production Management on January 7, 1941. Executive Order 8629 defined OPM's mission. Like NDAC, OPM was a temporary, emergency organization designed to work with numerous federal agencies, the military, trade associations, private firms, and individuals to “increase, accelerate, and regulate” defense production. Also like NDAC, OPM dispensed advice rather than orders. Alarmed by German and Japanese gains and by British vulnerability, Roosevelt pushed U.S. rearmament forward, ordering OPM to secure more raw materials, plant, and equipment for the manufacture of arms, munitions, and related goods. He also asked for a workable priorities system, given that certain raw materials were in scarce supply and ought to be parceled out in the order of their usefulness to the defense program.