A significant change took place in 1989 in most policy domains related to the EU’s external relations; that much has by now become evident. This was due to two closely intertwined developments, or better yet, processes: the policy and ideological shift from Keynesianism to neoliberalism; and the transition from a bipolar confrontation between two models of society and their corresponding spheres of influence towards a multipolar, international state system characterised by an unprecedented, complex interdependency. The era of a compartmentalised—and, in retrospect, relatively stably configured—global politics now belonged definitively to the past.

This new reality, which has been forced upon us in ever-more explicit ways for the past three decades, has not led to a greater insight or sense of urgency across the board about what is often euphemistically referred to as ‘new challenges’. In reality, these challenges are old and new threats to our security, where the new variants are frequently old threats in a new guise. Moreover, not all dangers are real or acute. Some are difficult to pinpoint—let alone quantify—on the basis of facts, and even in the case of generally accepted threats such as climate change, debates about the causes of such threats often persist.

This chapter looks at the EU's security environment in a changing world. In the discussion I use a broad definition of security that goes beyond the traditional outlook on political-military dangers. Genuine, supposed, and imaginary threats and dangers can be external but also internal; they are political-military but also social, economic, and psychological in nature; and they ultimately boil down to the distribution of power as well as the distribution of welfare. In the previous chapters I analysed the policy instruments of what is called the EU's external action (one part of its broader external relations—see also the foreword for a more detailed definition).