The diverse group of theories known as “posthumanism” shares perhaps but one characteristic: the belief that humanism, in our historical moment, has been, or needs to be, overcome. This collection, containing an introduction and a series of fourteen papers, many by frequent contributors to the Goethe Yearbook, might well have been entitled: “On Humanism: Essays for its Cultured Despisers.” Its greatest virtue (and source of delight) is its construction of fascinating and often unexpected interfaces between, very broadly speaking, (post-)Kantian writers and natural scientists and various directions of today's posthumanist thought. These connections work both ways: not only do they provide new windows into older texts, more and less familiar, but also offer different ways of understanding the most contemporary of themes, from computational neuroscience to global capitalism. Another virtue of the collection is its very varied discussion of the different species of posthumanism; though names like N. Katherine Hayles, Cary Wolfe, and Rosi Braidotti recur in many papers along with the terms “speculative realism,” “critical posthumanism,” and “object-oriented ontology,” each author has a different take on the nature and balance of these different approaches. Most significant is the question everywhere in the background—but left as an exercise to the reader to answer—what do these texts and authors from the “Age of Humanism” have to tell us today?

The essays in this collection are uniformly lucid, balanced in length, and each addresses from its particular angle the relationship between present and past. Since there is not enough space to do justice to them all, perhaps a partial catalogue of the intriguing connections made within and implied between them can demonstrate the richness and breadth of coverage. First, we read of relationships between eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophers and natural scientists and contemporary cybernetic, systems, and posthumanist theories that demonstrate the constancy of fundamental questions at distinctly different levels of physiological and technological sophistication: Kant's friend, the doctor Markus Herz on vertigo and Marvin Minsky guiding electronic rats through mazes in the 1950's (Jeffrey Kirkwood); Fichtean intersubjectivity and the Turing-test robots of Ex Machina (Alex Hogue); the physiologist Johannes Müller and enactive autopoesis (Edgar Landgraf); Hufeland and Braidotti on the role of death in life (Jocelyn Holland); Gall's phrenology and Derrida's deconstruction of the human/ animal distinction (Patrick Fortmann); Hegel's nonhuman Geist and Bateson (John H. Smith).