Starting around 1880, the scope of social transfers widened. No longer were social transfers just classic poor relief. Wholly new kinds of social transfer programs emerged – redistributive pension programs, unemployment compensation, accident and disability compensation, public health for the poor, and housing subsidies. More and more countries initiated each kind of transfer.

Why did the rise of social transfers happen so late in the long sweep of history, gathering momentum only late in the nineteenth century? Why did it then continue for one hundred years? What kinds of countries raised social transfers and the taxes needed to pay for it, becoming full-fledged welfare states? What forces made their political systems do this, when other countries held back? Why, after 1980, did the share of social transfers in GDP stagnate but not decline, despite the highly publicized conservative revolution led by Reagan and Thatcher?

The history of social transfers since 1880 is explained largely by the same democratization that shaped the pre-1880 history of poor relief in Chapters 3 and 4 and the rise of public education in Chapter 5 and 6. Four other starring roles were played by population aging, globalization, income growth, and shifts in the social affinities felt by middle-income voters. A supporting role was played by a shift in Catholic attitudes toward government social programs. This chapter sketches how these starring and supporting roles help us interpret the delayed and partial emergence of the welfare state.