INTRODUCTION: THE THEORETICAL CONSTANTS

as a theoretical construct, the Sunnī theory of law has, since its beginnings, operated on two levels of discourse between which a clear distinction must be drawn if we are to gain an adequate understanding of what this theory and its history are about. The first level of discourse represents a substructure that is thoroughly bound by the unalterable proposition of the divine command. Here, no amount of interpretation or intellectual manipulation could change the basic givens underlying, or the presuppositions governing, this discourse. The components of the discourse surrounding this first level may thus be characterized as theoretical constants, incapable of transmutation despite the changing pressures of time and social exigencies. Conceptually, any change in the fundamental assumptions operating on this level was thought to be tantamount to a complete abandonment of (Sunnī) Islam as a religion.

Sunnism as a religious and, thus, a legal identity was defined by the founding principles of legal theory. That is to say, the acceptance or rejection of these principles, which squarely belong to the first level of theoretical discourse, determined, respectively, one's affiliation to, or dissent from, the Sunnī fold. It was not without good reason that this fold was labeled ahl al-sunna wal-jamdcāʿa, referring to the main body of Muslims (jamāʿa), the Sunnīs, who united around a set of principles and tenets upon which they agreed (ijtamaʿū ʿalā) in the form of a consensus (ijmāʿ), to uphold as the distinguishing mark of their identity.