The uprising against the government of Mu’ammar al-Qadhai that started in eastern Libya in February 2011 questioned many of the assumptions even seasoned observers of the country had made about the regime and about its durability. To many, the carapace of security organizations and other measures to protect the regime had long seemed unassailable. Yet, slightly over six months later, on the 1 September 2011 anniversary of Qadhai ’s revolution, the Libyan leader was in hiding, and an international conference in Paris announced measures to provide international support to the Libyan opposition to help rebuild Libya. Seven weeks later, on 20 October, Qadhai was dead. h e willingness, by a population that had for more than four decades been cowered by the diktats of Qadhai ’s revolution, to stand up for its rights seemed almost beyond belief. h e surprise was even greater in light of internal developments in Libya since December 2003 when the government had agreed to hand over its weapons of mass destruction to the West and had embarked on a period of economic liberalization and reintegration into the international community that had seemingly provided a safety valve for the regime.