French exploitation, occasional repression, and an international climate favoring self-determination drove nationalist Algerians to start (again) an uprising in late 1954. France's choice of reaction to this violent wave of Algerian nationalism was almost preordained, The two major policy alternatives to war – rapid and egalitarian integration, or disengagement – were politically and psychologically unsustainable. On the one hand, hardly anybody in France would have agreed to a massive transfer of resources and an honest power-sharing program that equitable integration would have required. Ethnic, religious, cultural, and racial divisions between French and Algerians, and a French preoccupation with the standard of living in France, combined to preclude any such attempt. On the other hand, no government could seriously contemplate rapid disengagement. The most powerful politicians in France were deeply committed to French Algeria. The Algerian lobby and the army were sure to evoke the bitter memories of World War II and Indochina, raise a challenge no government could meet, and veto what they perceived as “abandonment.” Besides, with few exceptions, repression proved to have been effective throughout the entire colonial history of France, including in Algeria. Thus, the only political option open to the French government in late 1954 was to keep Algeria by means of force.