The most obvious characteristic of Israel's instrumental dependence, in the early 1980s, was its wide scope and depth. Structural features over which Israel had little control – most notably, the magnitude of the security threats Israel faced and its geostrategic vulnerability and demographic inferiority vis-à-vis its Arab enemies – simply called for a comprehensive mobilization of its human and economic resources. Thus, as a result of external threats, the boundaries between Israeli society and the state were blurred. Israeli Jewish society, one could add, was tightly meshed with its military. Hence, Israel's comprehensive conscription policy, large defense budget, and high tax rate. Indeed, the majority of Israeli Jewish males served three years of compulsory military service, conscripts who became officers served additional periods, and both groups continued to serve on active reserve service for several weeks each year for up to four decades following their mandatory conscription service. Similarly, Israel's defense expenditures were always high, and in 1978–1980, for example, they reached 17 percent of GNP (excluding U.S. grants). In 1981, a year before the Lebanon war, the tax burden on Israelis – that is, tax revenues as a percentage of the GNP – amounted to 46 percent.

Considering the skills and commitment of Israeli society at large and the comprehensive extraction and conscription system, it is not much of a surprise that the Israeli state has at its disposal a particularly powerful military.