Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgments
- PART I
- PART II
- 5 The French War in Algeria
- 6 French Instrumental Dependence and its Consequences
- 7 The Development of a Normative Difference in France, and Its Consequences
- 8 The French Struggle to Contain the Growth of the Normative Gap and the Rise of the “Democratic Agenda”
- 9 Political Relevance and its Consequences in France
- PART III
- PART IV
- Postscript
- Bibliography
- Index
9 - Political Relevance and its Consequences in France
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgments
- PART I
- PART II
- 5 The French War in Algeria
- 6 French Instrumental Dependence and its Consequences
- 7 The Development of a Normative Difference in France, and Its Consequences
- 8 The French Struggle to Contain the Growth of the Normative Gap and the Rise of the “Democratic Agenda”
- 9 Political Relevance and its Consequences in France
- PART III
- PART IV
- Postscript
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The French people at large were not captive of the “Algérie française” theme. But neither were they convinced that Algeria must be abandoned because of moral or economic considerations. Most French people simply chose to exclude themselves from the debate over Algeria. Of course, some regions and sectors tended to be more opposed to the war than others. Certainly the war was not too popular in Left-dominated regions or in regions whose inhabitants' interests were threatened by the Algerian economy. Thus, Marseilles, where a solid one-third of the vote was Communist, produced greater activity against the war than other cities. And among the least favorable to the plight of the pieds-noirs were regions in the south-east of France, where the population was inherently separatist and regarded the Algerian settlers as unwelcome competitors in the market of lesser wines.
The general French apathy was above all shown by the small scale of anti-war activity. The first demonstrations against mobilization and against the war usually attracted no more than several hundred people. Later, demonstrations grew larger. At times, they consisted of a few thousand people. But, with the exception of three mass demonstrations that had either to do with the future of democracy or were organized after Algeria's future was all but decided, they rarely consisted of more than 10,000 people. In fact, at least initially, the pro-French Algeria forces were able to counter-rally against the anti-war protestors.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- How Democracies Lose Small WarsState, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam, pp. 136 - 152Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003