Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgments
- PART I
- PART II
- PART III
- 10 The Israeli War in Lebanon
- 11 Israeli Instrumental Dependence and Its Consequences
- 12 The Development of a Normative Difference in Israel, and Its Consequences
- 13 The Israeli Struggle to Contain the Growth of the Normative Gap and the Rise of the “Democratic Agenda”
- 14 Political Relevance and Its Consequences in Israel
- PART IV
- Postscript
- Bibliography
- Index
14 - Political Relevance and Its Consequences in Israel
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgments
- PART I
- PART II
- PART III
- 10 The Israeli War in Lebanon
- 11 Israeli Instrumental Dependence and Its Consequences
- 12 The Development of a Normative Difference in Israel, and Its Consequences
- 13 The Israeli Struggle to Contain the Growth of the Normative Gap and the Rise of the “Democratic Agenda”
- 14 Political Relevance and Its Consequences in Israel
- PART IV
- Postscript
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The Israeli forces that opposed the Lebanon war succeeded in halting Sharon and bringing the war to a grinding halt. Both were no small achievements, particularly considering that they were gained in the marketplace of ideas and as they involved a society that was conditioned to support almost any tough security stand. This, however, does not indicate that the Israeli society as a whole, or even a majority in Israel, opposed the war. Rather, all indicators suggest that the anti-war coalition remained a minority with limited social and political reach. The anti-war coalition stripped the government of the mantle that an active security policy had provided, and shook the overwhelming popular support it had initially enjoyed. But the former did not turn around the opinions of most Israelis, concerning the war, its conduct, or the leadership that brought the failed war upon them. The Kahan Commission of Inquiry more or less captured this social reality when its members wrote that they did not “deceive [themselves] that the result of this inquiry will convince or satisfy those who have prejudices or selective consciences, [for whom] this inquiry was not intended …” Indeed, during the first year of the war, which was the most intense period in terms of the war and state-society strife, the majority of Israelis did not oppose the government war policy, nor, as Table 14.1 suggests, did their confidence in Begin, the government, and even Sharon change all that radically.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- How Democracies Lose Small WarsState, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam, pp. 208 - 226Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003