In the last chapter I argued that the requirement of reciprocity as an element of justice rendered justice possible only within a community that is characterized by a set of both shared interests and moral beliefs. I concluded by arguing that when applied to environmental justice, this means that communities are in a relationship of reciprocity with only their own future generations and not with all future persons. This less-than-cosmopolitan requirement of reciprocity has both moral and political significance, especially because, as we saw Brian Barry argue in Chapter 1, it raises the possibility that moral communities will ignore the welfare of other future communities to which one's own community's successor generations will not belong. In moral terms this possibility appears to allow too unacceptable levels of preferential treatment (even if reciprocal) for it to be associated with the concept of justice; in political terms it seems to lionize nationalism at its worst.

To avoid such dismal conclusions, we should first recognize that both moral philosophy and political theory have long histories of considering the place of “moral particularism” (as philosophers refer to preference for compatriots) and of nationalism within the realm of justice.