I refer those seeking a summary of the preceding arguments to the final sections of Parts One and Two. Rather than recapitulating previous chapters, I would like to use this conclusion to explain why it seems worth following this work with a book on apologies in law. I provide this preview not only to promote the sequel, but also to provide those who stop reading here with a hint of just how thoroughly our legal environments structure our thinking about apologies. If religion and its practices of repentance once provided the backdrop that framed our understandings of apologies, law increasingly plays that role in modern life. A specific kind of law driven by adversarial procedures and oriented toward economic outcomes increasingly structures our apologies. Whereas apologies tend to bring people together, adversarial law pushes legal combatants apart in a high-stakes competition.

If one doubts the law's influence over our culture of apologies, place any example from this book within the context of the victim having already brought a legal claim of some sort against the offender. Consider even how my philosophy department's response to fictional allegations of sexism would change if we faced formal charges of harassment or discrimination. The specter of litigation would haunt our discussions even if no one had threatened to bring a claim against us.