Introduction

The co-optation of the dakwah movement and the subsequent Islamisation race between PAS and UMNO have relocated the discourse of Islam as the legitimate socio-political structure from the periphery to the centre. This has normalised the conception of Islam as the righteous governing structure, marking a historical milestone that would come to shift cultural meanings and re-define social structures within the Malaysian state. Moreover, the co-optation of the Islamist opposition and the race between UMNO and PAS over the appropriate implementation of Islamic tenets have normalised a discourse of political contestation vis-à-vis the righteousness of Islamic governance. This, is turn, came to shape the psyche of a new generation. The new generation of jihadi recruits for ISIS, unlike the older generations, are attracted to the apparent righteousness of the outfit, embodied by the establishment of the Caliphate and the implementation of Shari’a according to the Qur’an and the Hadith. Also, they are inspired by the group's persistent rhetoric of waging jihad for the ummah's defence. The older generation of jihadi recruits were schooled in pondok schools and madrasahs, had fought in Afghanistan and were part of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) or Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), the latter being Southeast Asian jihadi units. The social networks of the older generations were clearly demarcated, both politically and religiously, and served as the main vehicle for recruitment and socialisation of jihadi ideas. On the contrary, this new generation of jihadi recruits have little or, most often, no religious training. Moreover, recruitment occurred via social media or the internet at large, allowing for the creation of a virtual space which encompassed an extra-territorial community. Malaysian nationals who joined ISIS in Syria were grouped under ISIS's Southeast Asian unit, Katibah Nusantara (also known in Arabic as Majmu’ah al Arkhabiliy). According to Sidney Jones, Katibah Nusantara was established to cater for the inability of Southeast Asian members to communicate in either English or Arabic. In a comprehensive report on ISIS foreign fighters, the Soufan Group estimated the number of Malaysian fighters as 100, out of whom five were returnees (Soufan Group 2015). The report highlighted that a majority of the Malaysian nationals who joined ISIS were families who ‘largely had no prior association with extremist groups, appeared to be motivated by a desire to be good Muslims and had a romanticized notion of an Islamic caliphate’ (USAID 2016).