Logic as Metaphysics

Hegel has proved influential by virtue of the method rather than the system of his philosophy. He has been regarded above all as a subtle exponent of dialectic, and his work has found considerable resonance, particularly in Marxist thought and social philosophy in general, because of the claim that all states of affairs should ultimately be interpreted ‘dialectically’. But the approval accorded this approach has actually served rather to obscure a general understanding of his principal work, the Science of Logic. The ‘dialectic’ is a procedure of thinking – but how can such a procedure give rise to content? For every science must first be able to present a content that it is specifically competent to treat. And more to the point: if dialectic is indeed a procedure of thinking, then it must advance by means of contradictions – but how could a system ever arise out of contradictions?

Readers and exegetes of Hegel, when they are not prepared simply to parrot his words, have generally capitulated before these claims. They have turned their attention instead to those of his writings that do not essentially contain the key to the system, but rather try and apply the dialectical method to the tangible themes of history, society or art. Thus the most influential writings of Hegel have been, originally, the Philosophy of Right, and in the twentieth century, first, the Phenomenology of Spirit and, later, the lectures on Aesthetics.