Book contents
- Inside Countries
- Inside Countries
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures, Tables, and Maps
- Contributors
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I Issues of Method and Research Design
- Part II Regimes and Representation
- Part III States and Security
- 6 Multilevel Partisan Conflict and Drug Violence in Mexico
- 7 Subnational Units, the Locus of Choice, and Concept Formation
- Part IV Social and Economic Development
- Conclusion
- Index
- References
6 - Multilevel Partisan Conflict and Drug Violence in Mexico
When Do Criminal Organizations Attack Subnational Elected Officials?
from Part III - States and Security
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 June 2019
Book contents
- Inside Countries
- Inside Countries
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures, Tables, and Maps
- Contributors
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I Issues of Method and Research Design
- Part II Regimes and Representation
- Part III States and Security
- 6 Multilevel Partisan Conflict and Drug Violence in Mexico
- 7 Subnational Units, the Locus of Choice, and Concept Formation
- Part IV Social and Economic Development
- Conclusion
- Index
- References
Summary
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- Information
- Inside CountriesSubnational Research in Comparative Politics, pp. 181 - 213Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019
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