The more one practises philosophy, the more readily one forgets that it is a practice. And like any practice, it is accompanied by its own practical sense, that is a series of dispositions and theoretical and affective reflexes, as well as modes of perception, values, objectives and all the strategies necessary to ‘play the game’ and believe in its stakes. Strictly speaking, it is not here a question of so many theoretical presuppositions that could be made explicit by philosophical reflection. On the contrary, it is a matter of the unquestioned givens (évidences) of practice, which are so obvious that they are not even objects of reflection or critique. One cannot forget, in this regard, that the philosophic practice that consists in unveiling the presuppositions behind a certain intellectual posture is itself founded upon an entire series of unquestioned givens, notably the following: there is an opposition between thought and the unthought; a presupposition is a sign of theoretical weakness; one must attempt to think the unthought by getting rid of all presuppositions; and the philosophy with the fewest presuppositions is the most astute. The unveiling of presuppositions is thus precisely part of philosophic practice, or rather of a certain philosophic practice. The same cannot be said for the metaphilosophical analysis of unquestioned givens. For, within a practice (if it be philosophical or not), one hardly ever interrogates the unquestioned givens that constitute it for at least two reasons. First of all, this is generally of no interest for the practice itself, and practical sense directs us toward other objects of analysis. Secondly, the study of a practice's unquestioned givens would hinder one's full participation in it, because questioning the rules of the game interrupts the playing of the game.