Indonesian politics was redefined after 1998. On 21 May 1998, President Soeharto resigned. It was the end of the New Order (1966–98) and the beginning of what became popularly known as the reformasi (“reform”) era. Reformasi brought an end to authoritarianism and introduced democracy. There were high hopes that the new era would bring political stability, restore economic growth, and halt social and ethnic conflict, issues that had characterized Indonesia since the mid- to late 1990s.

The initial period from Soeharto's resignation to the parliamentary elections on 7 June 1999 was dominated by the proliferation of political parties and the endeavours of those parties to ensure electoral survival. Rivalry over the succession to interim President Professor B. J. Habibie characterized the months between the elections and the first post-election meeting of the country's supreme decision making body, the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (“People's Consultative Assembly”, MPR) in October 1999. Abdurrahman Wahid was elected president on 21 October, but escalating tension, and eventually, deadlock between him and the parliament dominated the ensuing twenty-one months and led to his dismissal from office in July 2001. He was replaced by Vice-President Megawati Soekarnoputri. In October 2004, Dr Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono took over the presidency after Indonesia's first direct presidential elections in July and September 2004, which had followed the second legislative elections in April of the same year.

This book is about the beliefs and the behaviour of Islamist political parties and organizations in those dynamic and often unstable first years of Indonesian democracy. I highlight that constitutional Islamist politics is to various degrees confronted with the tension of practical and idealist concerns. Accepting the provisos of a non-Islamic political system, it fully and consciously gives way in its actions to the qualifications set out by the constitutional framework and the government that is based on it. I further highlight that, because of such commitment, Islamists often have to modify their political approach and follow practical-pragmatic considerations. They often differentiate between immediate and ultimate objectives, in accordance with what particular social and political circumstances permit and suggest as being strategically wise.