Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- PART I KANTIAN VIRTUE
- PART II A KANTIAN RESPONSE TO RECENT ACCOUNTS OF HUMILITY
- PART III THE KANTIAN VIRTUE OF HUMILITY
- PART IV THE VIRTUES OF KANTIAN HUMILITY
- 8 The humble pursuit of self-knowledge
- 9 The humble pursuit of respect for persons
- Conclusion
- References
- Index
8 - The humble pursuit of self-knowledge
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 February 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- PART I KANTIAN VIRTUE
- PART II A KANTIAN RESPONSE TO RECENT ACCOUNTS OF HUMILITY
- PART III THE KANTIAN VIRTUE OF HUMILITY
- PART IV THE VIRTUES OF KANTIAN HUMILITY
- 8 The humble pursuit of self-knowledge
- 9 The humble pursuit of respect for persons
- Conclusion
- References
- Index
Summary
The purpose of this last part of the book is to dwell in more depth on what will still remain a preliminary picture of the person who lives life with a meta-attitude of humility. What would it really mean for one's life and actions, to accept humility as the point of view, or perspective, from which to exercise one's agency? To consider these questions from a Kantian perspective, we need to look with more care at the specific duties of a moral agent, and consider humility as the perspective from which they are pursued. Following Kant, and recalling the two main obligatory ends introduced in chapter 3, I shall thus pursue this preliminary picture of the humble person by distinguishing a variety of ways that living from a humble perspective influences the two major groups of duties, viz., duties to self (that is, the obligatory end to perfection of the self) and duties to others (that is, the obligatory end to promote others' happiness). What will emerge in the end is a more concrete picture of the humble person, a picture of how she treats herself, other persons, and moral obligations more generally speaking.
Because Kant asserts, and I follow, that duties to self are in some way yet to be fully articulated previous to duties to others, I will first consider humility's relation to the obligatory end of perfection of self; and will turn, in chapter 9, to a consideration of how humility is relevant to the fulfillment of the obligatory end relative to others.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Kant and the Ethics of HumilityA Story of Dependence, Corruption and Virtue, pp. 217 - 241Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2005