That left-wing and Communist inspired campaigns for a Popular Front were not so much irrelevant as counter-productive, was demonstrated in the autumn of 1938. The Left Book Club was at a peak of popularity and enthusiasm. Yet when, for a few months, a parliamentary alliance between Tory rebels and Labour seemed a possibility, this had nothing to do with the campaigns of the extreme left, which served only as an irritant and distraction.

For a brief period after the Munich crisis, Conservative opponents of appeasement were so appalled by what Chamberlain had done that a number of them again considered very seriously the possibility of a tactical alliance with Labour. Secret and unofficial discussions were initiated to see what arrangements might be made in the Commons and in the constituencies. Labour leaders gave this initiative a cautious encouragement, and then made their own tentative approach. But nothing happened. Talks never went beyond the preliminary stages.

Responsibility for this was shared. The Tory rebels were divided and uncertain. But Conservative doubts were heavily reinforced by the hesitations and evident reluctance of the PLP leaders with whom they had to deal, and on whom their political lives might depend. The Labour leaders held back until the opportunity had passed, inhibited by memories of 1931, and by trade union and rank and file opinion which had been conditioned by several years of intra-party warfare to regard all ‘fronts’ and alliances as dangerous and disruptive.