The significance of Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar's Laboratory Life (1979, 1986) for science studies can hardly be exaggerated – it provided a theoretical framework and a working model for so many ‘second-wave’ (rejecting the Mertonian ‘first wave’) sociologists of science, some even critical of Latour and Woolgar, who were dealing with diverse questions of science/society interactions in numerous settings. It also anticipated the science wars and provided a (frequently unrecognised) pragmatic alternative to the stereotypical images of social constructivism. Moreover, Chapter 5 of Laboratory Life (exploring the ‘cycle of credibility’ among scientists) anticipated the current interest in the economics of science in science studies. As to law and legal contexts, Laboratory Life anticipated both the Daubert revolution in evidence law, where philosophical questions about the nature and reliability of science would be the subject of US Supreme Court speculation, as well as contemporary concerns over the effects of financial bias on scientific research and expertise.

The term ‘economics of science’ has multiple connotations, referring in the first instance either to the application of economic models to the scientific enterprise, or to the behaviour of scientists as they compete in the ‘market’ for scientific knowledge, perhaps trading in reputation or credibility (e.g. Bourdieu's ‘symbolic capital’) instead of money. Secondarily, the term can refer narrowly to the effect of financial support on research outcomes, or more broadly to the effect of the economy on the scientific enterprise, whether (in either case) positive or negative.