Introductory Remarks

Luck egalitarianism holds that variations in the levels of advantage held by different persons (that is, inequalities) are justified if, and only if, facts about those persons' choices or opportunities have made them responsible for those variations. One of the most important things to notice about such statements is the defining role given to both equality and responsibility. One can truthfully say that luck egalitarianism is just as much a form of ‘responsibilitarianism’ – that school of theories that seeks to make distributions sensitive to responsibility – as it is a form of egalitarianism – that school of theories that seeks to make distributions equal in some significant sense. This book has so far followed the majority of discussions of luck egalitarianism in focusing on luck egalitarianism's egalitarianism, and has supported most of its claims – and particularly those of equal opportunity for welfare – in this area. This chapter will seek to right the balance by considering issues relating specifically to luck egalitarianism's responsibilitarianism, although equality will continue to play a major role. The issues discussed will be of broader interest if, as will be suggested here, responsibilitarianism implies luck egalitarianism.

Responsibilitarian considerations may bolster luck egalitarianism in a number of ways. If luck egalitarianism truly is a theory that is both egalitarian and responsibilitarian, luck egalitarianism may be able to draw on a wide range of arguments (including some desert-, entitlement-, and autonomy-based arguments) which are near relatives of responsibility-based arguments.