HOW DEMANDING IS KANTIAN VIRTUE?

In the last chapter we saw that Kant's notion of imperfect duties brings to bear the important idea of discretionary latitude: We have play-room (Spielraum) in how we fulfill our ends. The introduction of this notion seemed a helpful way of relaxing what can be an overly rigoristic feature in Aristotle's account – perhaps best expressed by the thought that while there are many ways to go wrong in fulfilling virtue, there is only one way to get it right. Put this way, “hitting the mean” gives the sense that virtue has a determinate manifestation relative to each person – toward this object, at this time, in this manner. The discretionary element of good judgment becomes obscured. Still, Kant's notion of latitude may leave us wondering just how demanding his own conception of virtue is.

In this chapter I want to explore the kind of latitude imperfect duties permit. We can locate our discussion within the context of a pair of familiar, though conflicting, criticisms often leveled against Kant's theory of virtue. On the one side, it is argued that Kantian virtue theory is too latitudinarian, giving arbitrary discretion to whether we fulfill duties of virtue. This is sometimes couched within a more general view that Kantian ethics, as a duty-based theory, is minimalist insofar as doing one's duty is conceived of as doing some minimal amount and no more.