Maritime Power and the Power of Money in Louis XIV's France Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Illustrations and Tables
- Acknowledgements
- List of Abbreviations
- General Introduction
- Part I The Strategic and Fiscal Context
- Part II The Financing of Naval Expenditure
- Part III Paymaster Accountability and the Limitations of the State
- Part IV The Development and Management of the Naval Treasury
- Part V Fiscal Overextension and Operational Paralysis in the Era of the Spanish Succession
- Conclusion
- Appendix I Military-related spending in livres by exercice or financial year in the era of the Spanish Succession conflict, 1700–13
- Appendix II Military-related spending in livres by exercice or financial year in the era of the Nine Years’ War, 1689–99
- Appendix III Royal revenues in livres excluding the capitation and dixième taxes, 1683–1713
- Appendix IV Royal revenues in livres including the capitation and dixième taxes, 1683–1713
- Appendix V The average geographical distribution of Louis XIV's fleet in terms of rated warships and frégates légères, 1701–09
- Appendix VI Naval spending by area of expenditure, 1701–09
- Appendix VII The time frame in which the trésoriers were ordered to acquit naval costs, 1701–09
- Appendix VIII Summary of borrowing by trésorier Jacques de Vanolles during the exercice of 1703
- Appendix IX Detailed breakdown by source of revenue of the funding provided to the naval and galley treasuries, 1702–08
- Select Bibliography
- Index
General Introduction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 February 2024
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Illustrations and Tables
- Acknowledgements
- List of Abbreviations
- General Introduction
- Part I The Strategic and Fiscal Context
- Part II The Financing of Naval Expenditure
- Part III Paymaster Accountability and the Limitations of the State
- Part IV The Development and Management of the Naval Treasury
- Part V Fiscal Overextension and Operational Paralysis in the Era of the Spanish Succession
- Conclusion
- Appendix I Military-related spending in livres by exercice or financial year in the era of the Spanish Succession conflict, 1700–13
- Appendix II Military-related spending in livres by exercice or financial year in the era of the Nine Years’ War, 1689–99
- Appendix III Royal revenues in livres excluding the capitation and dixième taxes, 1683–1713
- Appendix IV Royal revenues in livres including the capitation and dixième taxes, 1683–1713
- Appendix V The average geographical distribution of Louis XIV's fleet in terms of rated warships and frégates légères, 1701–09
- Appendix VI Naval spending by area of expenditure, 1701–09
- Appendix VII The time frame in which the trésoriers were ordered to acquit naval costs, 1701–09
- Appendix VIII Summary of borrowing by trésorier Jacques de Vanolles during the exercice of 1703
- Appendix IX Detailed breakdown by source of revenue of the funding provided to the naval and galley treasuries, 1702–08
- Select Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Between the late 1660s and early 1690s, the French navy underwent significant operational and administrative expansion. Naval minister and contrôleur général (finance minister) Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1665–83) and later his son, the marquis de Seignelay (1683–90), presided over a series of naval reforms in an effort to match Anglo-Dutch naval strength. Rebuilding the navy required not only the construction and acquisition of ships, but also the creation of a naval supply chain, investments in ports and arsenals at Toulon, Brest, and Rochefort, the formation of a conscription system to supply the navy with over 40,000 sailors, and the oversight of a centralised, commission-based administrative system of maritime intendants and commissaires, the king's agents in the ports with a broad array of responsibilities. While Colbert's navy was built on a network of ‘fisco-financiers’, where administrative and subcontracting roles were often conflated, the growth of Louis XIV's navy echoed, it would seem, a wider determination by the king to reassert monarchical sovereignty and establish firm royal control over the armed forces.
With impressive speed, the navy increased in size and sophistication over the course of three decades, expanding from 18 ships in 1661 to 132 rated warships by January 1692. By 1676, when it gained an important victory over a combined Spanish-Dutch fleet at Palermo during the Franco-Dutch War (1672–78), the navy demonstrated its importance as an instrument of war by enabling the French monarchy to project its military power and influence beyond its immediate reach. The offshore bombardments of Algiers (1682–83), Genoa (1684), and Tripoli (1685) underscored not only the strategic value of a standing fleet, but also the devastating effect with which it could be deployed. On the surface, the results of the Colbertian naval reconstruction programme were decisive. France had a fleet capable of challenging the Anglo-Dutch navies both in terms of warship tonnage, and for relative strategic dominance of the Mediterranean between 1676 and 1693.
Yet, as the French navy reached the apogee of its numerical and operational strength during the Nine Years’ War (1688–97), Louis XIV's government was forced in 1694–95 to drawdown the fleet. The decades-long revival of the French navy came to a halt as fleet operations were suspended and Louis XIV's larger rated warships, emblematic of royal prestige and dynastic might, were laid up in Brest and Toulon. By 1695, the Atlantic fleet was no longer operating.
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- Information
- Maritime Power and the Power of Money in Louis XIV's FrancePrivate Finance, the Contractor State, and the French Navy, pp. 1 - 16Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2023