The origins of mechanics – both the practical development of devices and the creation of a body of theory about their operation – are obscure. Doubtless elements of the discipline, such as the use of lever and balance, axle-and-wheel, clepsydra and siphon, predated the fourth century bce. However, the creation of a discipline requires more than the use of certain kinds of technology: there needs to be some kind of unifying idea, some perception of commonality. Looking at the disparate elements that came to be included in the Greek discipline of mechanics, it is difficult to identify exactly what that perceived commonality was. It may be that the reason why mechanics came to be recognized as a discipline – a field of knowledge – was no more than a recognition that certain devices make possible results that would not have occurred without them, and that some of them worked in similar ways. The contribution of mechanics to the history of philosophy arose from its ensuing theories, as well as a more general commitment to the idea that the principles at work in mechanics can also be found in the natural world.

This chapter will examine the evidence concerning the creation of a discipline called ‘mechanics’ during the fourth century. Such a reconstructive project requires great caution against reading back assumptions about what ‘mechanics’ means, or about what is self-evident. In the end, I find the evidence from the fourth century to be inconclusive.