In this chapter I consider issues that form an essential background to the question how the development of ancient mechanics might have impacted on ancient natural philosophy. Such an impact could take different forms, and it is important to be clear on what would count as a ‘mechanical’ or ‘mechanistic’ conception, using the term to describe a way of conceiving of the natural world by reference to mechanics. The question needs to be posed in a way that is neither too broad nor too narrow in scope, in order to appreciate what effects the discipline of mechanics might have had on natural philosophy.

At a time when mechanics was understood to work because of principles that could be identified and theorized, we might expect philosophers to consider the applicability of these principles to the study of other kinds of motion and its causes. But it is also possible for natural philosophers to take inspiration from mechanics independently of such a theoretical understanding. Experience with constructing devices might give rise to new ideas about the properties of matter, or the way it interacts. The presence of working artifacts that can approximate the functions taken to be definitive of animals might call into question the distinction in kind between organism and artifact, or suggest ways that animal functions might be realized by material means.