On June 2, 2003, the Republican-dominated Federal Communications Commission took a predictable step in its seemingly unstoppable movement toward media deregulation. It announced a major relaxation of its already relaxed rules restricting media concentration. The communications sector, the FCC found, is rife with competition. Ownership concentration presents little threat. More surprisingly, reducing restrictions on media mergers produced a storm of protest, from both the left and right, involving more vocalized public opposition than any FCC action ever. The FCC basically ignored nearly two million people of all political persuasions who registered their opposition. William Safire argued that “concentration of [media] power … should be anathema to conservatives.” Safire credited much of the effectiveness of “the growing grass roots” movement “against giantism” in the media to “right-wing outfits,” although he also noted the role of progressives including Bill Moyers. Opposition was not without at least temporary effect. Congress partially reversed the FCC action. Then the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found most of the remainder unjustified, sending the relaxed rules back to the FCC for reconsideration.

The primary causal explanation for the FCC's ill-starred action may lie in the power and economic self-interest of major media companies. Political causal explanation, however, is not my subject. Policies require justifications. This book defends the merits of restricting ownership concentration. It then evaluates the intellectual and policy arguments offered for the FCC's hardening view that media concentration is now not a real problem and that ownership restrictions can thwart the public interest.