Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-pftt2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-24T06:47:05.997Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

3 - Not a Real Problem: The Market or the Internet Will Provide

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

C. Edwin Baker
Affiliation:
University of Pennsylvania
Get access

Summary

This chapter addresses two additional arguments – a market thesis and an Internet thesis – offered by those who reject current popular worries about media concentration. Their two arguments are: As long as traditional antitrust laws are enforced, the free market leads even large media entities to provide properly for audiences or, in any event, denies them any real power in the public sphere. Second, the Internet eliminates any reasons to object to media concentration. Each assertion is considered in turn.

THE MARKET CONTROLS AND PROVIDES

Ubiquitous among the many people who have a virtually mystical faith in free markets is the belief that within the market the consumer is sovereign. Firms compete to give the consumer what she wants. Given this belief, it would seem to follow that liberal interventionism must be paternalistic or worse (e.g., rent-seeking). If the market is left unregulated, firms purportedly prosper only by giving consumers what they want – or, more precisely, what they want given their resource constraints and given a particular, contestable, commodified conception of “want.” Firms that fail to do this – for example, because they are not good at it or because they try to do something else – will not succeed in the market. Bankruptcy quickly looms. If descriptively right, this first claim leads to a second: firms themselves have no real power; they must do what the market compels – which, according to the first claim, is to serve the consumer.

Type
Chapter
Information
Media Concentration and Democracy
Why Ownership Matters
, pp. 88 - 123
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2006

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×