This book began life as a series of occasional essays on the metaphysics of science, free will and the theory of moral obligation, but I think it has grown into something more than that, for it has a consistent and developing theme. I did not realize this at first. I was just doing what I love doing, and have been doing a lot since I retired from university teaching, namely, writing philosophy for my own enjoyment. But, one day, after re-reading an old paper of mine, it occurred to me that what I had written involved the systematic development of some of the ideas contained in this early paper, and their rational deployment in other areas of philosophy.

After I retired, I had many projects to complete; other philosophers saw to that. One was to write a substantial piece for the forthcoming Companion to the History of Philosophy in Australasia (edited by Graham Oppy et al.) The editors wanted me to write about my early work as a conventionalist in the philosophy of science, and the events that led me to reject conventionalism in favour of scientific realism. This project suited me. It was nicely reflective, and was one that I could easily complete without much need to go beyond the resources readily available to me in my own library. The first chapter of this book derives from this project.