China's encounter with the Middle East in the early 1950s did not produce any regular and established relationship. At that time, believing that the West was assailing Asia and Africa, the Chinese were not inclined to compromise with Middle Eastern governments, which they considered reactionary and subservient to Western imperialism. In turn, these governments, which had already opposed Chinese communism on national-religious grounds as well as under the influence of their Western mentors, became even more suspicious and hostile as a result of Peking's uncompromising international stance. However, from 1953–4 the Chinese began to perceive certain changes in the world situation: Western ‘imperialist aggression’ had been checked; the socialist camp had become stronger; and the Asian and African countries began to resist outside intervention. All these developments brought about a relative relaxation of international tension which enabled both China and the Arabs to reconsider and revise their respective attitudes and eventually to establish lasting relations.

China interpreted the settlement of the Korean and Indochinese problems as a major setback to the West. All over the world there were indications that the former colonial powers had been forced to retreat. The United States, which tried to expand into Asia and Africa at the expense of these powers, had to face not only their resistance but also that of the Asian and African peoples and the socialist camp.

The American advance further aggravated the ‘contradictions’ within the Western camp. Unlike the Soviet Union, China realised that imperialism had become less monolithic as some Western powers were beginning to drift away from American influence: ‘Prior to the present incident [Egypt's nationalisation of the Suez Canal], Britain and France had taken some rather wise actions favourable to the relaxation of international tension.