In China's analysis of the world situation, the Anglo-French military invasion of Egypt in October 1956 marked the end of a period of relative tranquillity in international affairs. But the Chinese were not so much concerned about the Anglo-French campaign itself. Although this was the first large-scale use of force by the West since the war in Korea and Indochina, Peking considered Britain and France as declining powers and the Suez episode as their desperate and anachronistic attempt to regain some of their traditional control over the Middle East. Less worried about the invasion itself, the Chinese became much more concerned about its outcome – the increased American involvement in the Middle East.

Mentally, the Chinese were fully prepared for such an eventuality. Mao had maintained all along that the United States, not Britain or France, was the principal imperialist enemy; that Asia and Africa, not the socialist camp, would provide the first and main target of imperialist ‘aggression’ and, therefore, the main battlefield on which to fight it; and that imperialism's expansion would only aggravate and expose its own weaknesses, or ‘contradictions’, thus offering better prospects for national liberation. Undoubtedly, Mao regarded the developments in the Middle East in 1957–9 as a confirmation of his theories. Consequently, his influence on China's foreign policy was felt very strongly in 1957–9.