Countries in the Nanyang have always been conscious of China, more so when it is united and prosperous and less so when it is weak and divided. As more people study modern China's foreign relations, they have noted the rupture between its structure of tribute and trade or “the Chinese world order” and the new system of nation-states governed by international law. Chinese reluctance to accept the rules introduced by the Great Powers into Asia went through many stages, and it is only recently that the government in Beijing is seen to be functioning comfortably in the dominant United Nations state-system. It is possible to explain that change as inevitable. After all, in the world of nationstates, China has no choice but play by the rules that guide the actions of all other states. But the fact that it took China so long to demonstrate that it accepted the key aspects of the system and the fact that some neighbouring states in Asia still have doubts about China's future intentions suggest that the issues remain less clear-cut than might have been expected.

On one hand, the position that imperial China had insisted on in dealing with foreign rulers through the centuries was always accompanied by given sets of ritual, defined levels of hierarchy and agreed criteria of hegemonic authority. However, despite the sense of continuity that Confucian historians have given to the nature of Chinese dynastic rule, there was never any immutable structure of tributary relationships. What seemed unchanging were the language of feudal condescension and the administrative rules drawn up by various Chinese courts to deal with power realities at different periods of history. Chinese rulers and mandarins had to be flexible in interpreting tribute relations according to the political, economic, security or cultural needs at any one time. They employed terms that appealed to forms of fealty, family or friendship with most of them interchangeable depending on circumstances.

On the other hand, the practical position China have taken since the second half of the nineteenth century was guided by principles of law incorporated into a modern system of nationstates introduced from the West. Despite the legal language that shaped modern international behaviour, the Chinese were painfully aware that much of that was subject to close examination and that, for each situation, there were always specific political, economic and security calculations to be made.