On 2 and 3 April 1559 at Cateau-Cambrésis the powers of western Europe once more agreed to make peace. The settlement then achieved after prolonged manœuvres and hesitations was destined to find its place among the decisive treaties in European history. Historians have accepted it as such, confirming its importance with that fanfare of trumpets so often reserved for the great acts of peace-making which check the persistent quarrelling in Europe. And they have done so with good reason.

In the first place, this great political event marked a turning-point. Although Charles V had died the year before, on 21 September 1558, the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis was the effective closure to his dramatic reign. With the accession of Philip II to power and majesty, a new epoch opened, certainly not less dramatic but of a different and harsher texture. It seemed as if an outdated style of empire, largely medieval in character and justifiable as such, maintained by imponderable and time-honoured traditions, was being directed by a more realistic and oppressive hand, henceforth devoid of political raison d'être and hesitant to show its true purpose. Such was the political importance of the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis. Can we assume that its economic importance was just as great?

Certainly the coincidence was more than slight. The peace allowed the international economy to recover its strength, and this brought considerable benefit. As the major conflict between France and the Habsburgs did not officially return to open warfare until 17 January 1595, almost half a century later, the economic activity of western Europe enjoyed a period of prolonged ease and recuperation. On this occasion, as often happens withthe disbanding of armies, there were the pleasures of peace: the wines of the south once more found their way northwards in regular abundance.