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Chapter 8 - It necessarily ain't so

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Colin Howson
Colin Howson
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
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Summary

‘You can’t know everything.’

The ultimate Santa Claus

In Chapter 2 I pointed out that the omni-properties of the God of theism are there for a purpose, to allow God to have enough explanatory power to be able to account for everything that goes on in the universe. Swinburne tells us that being omnipotent, God can do whatever he wants to do, this side of logical possibility:

clearly, whatever e [e stands for ‘evidence’] is, God, being omnipotent, has the power to bring about e. He will do so, if he chooses to do so.

Earlier (Chapter 3, section 4), I cited as an example of an incredible ad hoc ‘explanation’ the hypothesis that the observed outcome of a sequence of coin-tosses happened as it did because Santa Claus willed it to, and that whatever Santa wills happens. In order to fulfil his diverse explanatory and regulatory duties, the God of theism is endowed with very similar powers. We are told that God created the universe. How could he do that? Easily: he can do anything he wants, and he wanted to create the universe. He has to create the conditions necessary for life and give a certainty of intelligent life emerging. How could he do that? Easily: he can do anything he wants, and he wanted to create the conditions for life to emerge. He can tell when any of us sins. How? Easily: he knows everything. God is the Ultimate Santa Claus hypothesis.

Type
Chapter
Information
Objecting to God , pp. 194 - 210
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2011

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References

Swinburne, RichardThe Existence of GodOxfordClarendon Press 1991 109CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grünbaum, AdolfThe Poverty of Theistic CosmologyBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 2004 561CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dawkins, RichardThe God DelusionLondonBantam Books 2006Google Scholar
Hoyle, FredWickramasinghe, ChandraEvolution From SpaceLondonJ. M. Dent & Sons 1981Google Scholar
Grim, PatrickLogic and Limits of Knowledge and TruthThe Impossibility of GodAmherst, NYPrometheus Books 2003 381Google Scholar
Kripke, SaulOutline of a Theory of TruthJournal of Philosophy 72 1975 690CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Logic with TreesNew YorkRoutledge 1997
Hallett's, MichaelCantorian Set Theory and Limitation of SizeOxford University Press 1984Google Scholar
Stenger, VictorGod: The Failed Hypothesis: How Science Shows that God Does Not ExistAmherst, NYPrometheus Books 2007Google Scholar
Spinoza, B.The EthicsLondonPenguin 1996Google Scholar
Mehra, J.The Beat of a Different Drum: The Life and Science of Richard FeynmanOxford University Press 1994Google Scholar

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  • It necessarily ain't so
  • Colin Howson, University of Toronto
  • Book: Objecting to God
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511812477.009
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  • It necessarily ain't so
  • Colin Howson, University of Toronto
  • Book: Objecting to God
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511812477.009
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • It necessarily ain't so
  • Colin Howson, University of Toronto
  • Book: Objecting to God
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511812477.009
Available formats
×