Aëtius 1.29.2 (Dox. 325b5–15)

(1) [Aristotle says] . . . that there are four causes in the whole according to which everything is constituted: intelligence, nature, necessity and chance. And each of these is double, one sort being in human affairs and the other in other things. Some things are fulfilled in every case, others for the most part, others differently at different times. (2) Fate is not a cause, but a manner [tropos] of cause, which attaches in a way to the ordered things that belong to necessity. (Sharples 2007b, 597)

Anonymous, On Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 149.33–150.4

(1) Having said that deliberation is concerned with things that can be done and depend on us–for these alone are left–[Aristotle] added as an indication that of the things mentioned the cause of some is nature, of others necessity, of others chance (placing the spontaneous too under chance), and of others intelligence. These are the things that come about through a human being and have a human being as their origin; and for this reason they are also up to us. (2) Fate too would be said to be placed under nature according to these men. For what is fated is neither inevitable nor necessary. (Sharples 2007b, 596)