Many have alleged that phenomenal consciousness can neither be accommodated within a physicalist world-view, nor reductively explained in physical terms. In this chapter I shall confront some of these ‘mysterian’ arguments, concentrating on those which are more metaphysical in nature. Then in the chapter which follows I shall deal with those which start from premises that are epistemic. If it is to be possible to provide a naturalistic explanation of phenomenal consciousness, as I intend, then all of these arguments must be flawed.

Perspectival and ‘myness’ facts

Nagel is often credited with putting the problem of phenomenal consciousness on the map. In this section I shall consider his main arguments. I shall show that they fail, and that their failure results from conflating notions which should be kept distinct.

What is it like to be a bat?

Nagel first asked this famous question in his 1974. His reply was that there must be an answer – there must be something which it is like to be a bat, resulting from the bat's distinctive way of experiencing the world through echo-location – but that we cannot know what it is. Nagel's view is that only someone who has had echo-location experiences, or experiences relevantly similar to those involved in echo-location, can know what it is like to be a bat.