I have tried, in this book, to defend the duty to obey the law on two fronts. I have tried to defend it against the attack on its very existence attempted by many philosophers, and against the corruptive use made of it by politicians and public figures.

Of the philosophers who would deny the existence of the duty to obey the law, some claim that the attempts to ground it have failed. I have demonstrated, in the second and third chapters, that there are some attempts that succeed. Their success, however, is not complete. They support a duty to perform actions because these have been ordered by law. This duty, if it applies at all, applies to everyone. But it doesn't apply in every case. It doesn't apply to unjust political systems, and, in the context of just systems, it doesn't apply to all laws in all the occasions to which they apply. Disobedience which will cause no damage whatsoever, either to the goal served by the given law, or to the operation of the institution of law as a tool for instituting and enforcing desirable conducts, is disobedience which cannot be questioned on the basis of any of the grounds of the duty to obey.

Other philosophers who would deny the existence of the duty to obey try to do so on the basis of the alleged contradiction between this duty and moral autonomy.