Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-v5vhk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-18T17:35:29.267Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

3 - Sense and Reference

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 July 2009

Richard L. Mendelsohn
Affiliation:
Lehman College, City University of New York
Get access

Summary

Introduction

Few texts are as well known to modern philosophers as Frege's (1892c: 151–2) opening paragraph:

Equality gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation? A relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects? In my Begriffsschrift, I assumed the latter. The reasons which seem to favour this are the following: a = a and a = b are obviously statements of differing cognitive value.…Now if we were to regard equality as a relation between that which the names ‘a’ and ‘b’ designate [bedeuten], it would seem that a = b could not differ from a = a (i.e. provided a = b is true). A relation would thereby be expressed of a thing to itself but to no other thing. What is intended to be said by a = b seems to be that the signs or names ‘a’ and ‘b’ designate [bedeuten] the same thing, so that those signs themselves would be under discussion; a relation between them would be asserted. But this relation would hold between the names or signs only in so far as they named or designated something. It would be mediated by the connexion of each of the two signs with the same designated thing. But this is arbitrary. Nobody can be forbidden to use any arbitrarily producible event or object as a sign for something.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2005

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • Sense and Reference
  • Richard L. Mendelsohn, Lehman College, City University of New York
  • Book: The Philosophy of Gottlob Frege
  • Online publication: 28 July 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511497964.005
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Sense and Reference
  • Richard L. Mendelsohn, Lehman College, City University of New York
  • Book: The Philosophy of Gottlob Frege
  • Online publication: 28 July 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511497964.005
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Sense and Reference
  • Richard L. Mendelsohn, Lehman College, City University of New York
  • Book: The Philosophy of Gottlob Frege
  • Online publication: 28 July 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511497964.005
Available formats
×