Introduction

In many respects, modern philosophy profoundly differs from medieval thought. In a sense, this truth is a trivial one, for medieval thought also differed from ancient philosophy, just as archaic, prephilosophical thought profoundly differed from ancient Greek, Hellenistic and Roman philosophia. Still, there is a secret to be uncovered. Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century thought, both in its philosophical and its theological sources, is much more alike medieval thought than is usually considered. Just as, in important respects, the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries might be reckoned among the early modern centuries, so the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries might also be reckoned among the Middle Ages. The academic continuity was still immense.

Nevertheless, in terms of the influence of the great individual early modern thinkers – single, usually writing in a modern language, outside the university – the Cartesian and Lockean revolution in the theories of knowledge and science delivers a different picture. In philosophy, epistemology became the heart of the matter, although this was only fully effectuated in the nineteenth century. However, medieval thought did not know of the dictatorship of epistemology, which was only broken by, for example, Wittgenstein halfway through the twentieth century. In the Middle Ages, epistemology and the theory of proof and demonstration were not a central concern, although they were dealt with skillfully. There was no epistemic anxiety, a phenomenon which arose mainly in the nineteenth century. The nineteenth century was the century of epistemological and methodological supremacy.