This chapter illustrates an overview of the institutional settings of governmental organisations and the distinctive features of policy processes in Japan. It shows how policy analysis is or is not employed in Japanese government.

Sectionalism in Japanese government and dispersed policy communities

Japan is a unitary state, not federal. Its political system is a constitutional monarchy, where the monarch (Emperor) is the symbol of national unity and has no political power. The Japanese constitution declares that democracy is its basic principle and stipulates to a parliamentary government where the legal sector is independent. The parliament of Japan, which is called the Diet, consists of the House of Representatives (lower house) and the House of Councillors (upper house). Although the lower house supersedes the upper house in premier nomination, treaty ratification and budget setting, their competences are relatively similar. The prime minister, who is nominated by the lower house, appoints ministers and organises the cabinet, which exercises administrative power. The unity of the cabinet is supported by the prime ministerial power of appointment and dismissal of ministers, and the cabinets have a joint responsibility to the Diet. Each minister is in charge of each administrative domain, respectively. The basic structure of the Japanese government under the present constitution has not been changed since its enactment just after the Second World War.

From the viewpoint of public policy, some special features of Japanese parliamentary government are very important (Iio, 2007). The Japanese administrative section under the cabinet has a strong centrifugal tendency in normal working situations, though the constitution gave a significant amount of power to the prime minister and tried to establish a powerful cabinet. For example, the power of the lower house on which the cabinet is based is relatively weak in relation to the upper house. If the government party or parties lose control of the upper house, the cabinet has a difficult time securing its consent. Even if the ruling party secures the majority of both houses, the cabinet does not control the Diet's deliberation; it must still rely on the negotiation among major parties to settle the deliberation schedule.