3.1 Increases in demand uncertainty yield decreases in agency bias.

3.2 Increases in penalty uncertainty yield decreases in agency bias.

3.3 In risk-averse agencies, increases in supply uncertainty yield increases in agency bias.

3.4 In risk-seeking agencies, increases in penalty uncertainty yield decreases in agency bias.

3.5 Task-Type Monitoring Principle. Congress monitors agencies with a penchant for perquisites more than those oriented toward constituency service; the least monitored agencies are those that expend additional resources performing more of the governance tasks they were created to perform.

3.6 Monitoring Accuracy Principle I. When monitoring provides accurate information for Congress, the agency provides accurate information about its cost of performing a governance task. However, if monitoring provides inaccurate information, the agency provides a cost estimate consistent with budget maximization.

3.7 When the agency is risk neutral, its bias in reporting costs decreases regardless of the penalty that Congress will impose. When the agency is risk averse, its bias increases.

3.8 When they become more uncertain about the budgetary penalty that Congress will impose, project agencies increase their bias, while task agencies reduce it.

3.9 Strategic Budget Uncertainty Principle. If Congress can increase uncertainty over reward or penalty budgets only when agencies request large (not small) budgets, then the agency always reduces its bias. When Congress does impose budget cuts, both project and task agencies are always less likely to bias its cost information.

3.10 Monitoring Accuracy Principle II. Improvements in monitoring technologies always lower the value of deception for the agency, producing truthful cost information.