Introduction

Do elected UN Security Council members receive perks during their terms? This empirical question constitutes the central concern of this book. Confronting it with quantitative data embodies the task of this chapter. Having presented many examples in Chapter 3, we now seek to test whether the examples represent exceptional cases or, instead, are part of a systematic pattern – and we must do so while remaining mindful of potential selection bias, as discussed in Chapter 4.

We begin our inquiry into the effects of UNSC membership with an examination of bilateral foreign aid. We then examine whether countries trade money for influence through multilateral organizations. Specifically, we consider the IMF, the World Bank, the United Nations, and regional development banks (RDBs). Finally, we address the more nuanced hypothesis of whether donor countries target swing voters on the UNSC.

Background on Bilateral Aid: The United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France

Throughout the history of the UNSC, the United States has served as the most prominent agenda-setter. Qualitative examples concerning the United States abound and thus fill the pages of Chapter 3. The focus of our quantitative analysis below begins, therefore, with the United States. We follow Kuziemko and Werker (2006), who show that the United States increases bilateral aid to UNSC members, specifically during important years when the Security Council receives heightened media attention.