In this chapter and the next, we develop a comprehensive theoretical framework that systematically answers the book's central questions about the conditions under which dictators are likely to enact anti-corruption measures and the resulting variation in corruption across autocracies. This chapter first focuses on discussing the main characteristics of, preferences of, and political tactics adopted by the two sets of key actors that are central to understanding corruption in autocracies: the owners of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the private sector and de facto opposition parties in directly elected multiparty legislatures. This chapter then explains how and why higher geographic concentration of domestic private SMEs in authoritarian countries enables firms there to build an effective national SME business association. In the following chapter, we build on this theoretical foundation to analyze the conditions under which interaction between the two sets of actors – domestic private SMEs and de facto legislative opposition parties – in autocracies politically induces dictators to curb corruption.

The remainder of this chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part, we provide an overview of the main features of SME owners, privately owned SMEs, their economic salience, the main governance issues they face, and their preferences regarding corruption. We discuss why understanding the preferences and behavior of SME owners is important for understanding the politics of corruption in autocracies and why SME owners must be analyzed as a distinct group of actors different from business elites and ordinary citizens. In the second part, we draw on insights from recent studies of domestic institutions in autocracies to provide an overview of the prevalence of elected multiparty legislatures and de jure and de facto opposition parties across autocratic regimes. We suggest that the imperatives of capitalizing on the opportunities provided by multiparty legislative elections under the constraints of these regimes particularly incentivize de facto legislative opposition parties in autocracies to seek out societal allies and form mutually beneficial coalitions with them on the basis of addressing salient issues such as corruption.

The third part considers the potential political strategies that private SME owners can adopt in order to raise their concerns about corruption in the politically risky environment of autocracies.