Electoral reform clearly made little sense without a corresponding change in structures of government themselves. The Soviet parliament, in particular, had for more than thirty years since its foundation been much less than the ‘highest body of state authority’ for which the Constitution ostensibly provided. The USSR Supreme Soviet was required to meet twice a year but did so for only two or three days on each occasion, making it one of the world's least frequently convened assemblies. Its deputies were all part-timers, reflecting the official view that political representation should form part of ordinary life and not a separate, ‘parasitic’ profession. There was an elaborate procedure for resolving differences between the Supreme Soviet's two chambers, but its votes had almost always been unanimous: the only recorded exception was in 1955 when an elderly lady delegate, overcome by shock, failed to register her approval of the resignation of Prime Minister Malenkov. Deputies were told when to speak, and – broadly speaking – what to say; and parliamentary journalists could file their copy before the session they were reporting had taken place. There was some attempt, in the late 1960s, to strengthen the Supreme Soviet through the development of its committee system; but for the most part the assembly Gorbachev inherited was – like its predecessors – an ‘ornamental’ rather than operational part of the political system, its purpose to invest party decisions with the ‘garb of constitutional legality’.